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POLICE MISCONDUCT AND LIABILITY:
APPLYING THE STATE-CREATED
DANGER DOCTRINE TO HOLD
POLICE OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR
RESPONDING INADEQUATELY TO
DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE SITUATIONS
Milena Shtelmakher*
When a state actor creates or contributes to the danger that an
individualfaces from a thirdparty, the state actor can be suedpursuant
to the state-createddanger doctrine. In the domestic-violence context,
victims can sue individual police officers pursuant to the doctrinefor
responding inadequately to the victims' calls for help, such as when
officers refuse to arrest the batterers,fail to file incident reports, or
harass the victims. However, because the doctrine formed from
Supreme Court dicta, courts do not apply it uniformly. This Note
proposes that Congress should enact a national standard for
determining when police conduct in domestic-violence situations
constitutes state-created danger. Holding police officers accountable
for such conduct will force them to respond properly and, most
importantly, protect victimsfrom further harm.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to express
special gratitude to Professor Laurie L. Levenson for providing invaluable guidance. Also, many
thanks to all the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their careful
editing of this Note. Most importantly, I am grateful to my parents, who always provide me with
the strength and support necessary for success.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In domestic-violence situations where a woman is being
physically abused by a current or former spouse or boyfriend, the
woman's first instinct might be to contact the police for emergency
protection.' This seems like it would be a sensible approach, but the
reality is not that simple. In fact, despite being a domestic-violence
victim's possible first line of defense, police officers respond
inadequately at times.2 For example, in the Second Circuit case Okin
v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Department,' plaintiff

Michele Okin was physically abused by her boyfriend.' Over a
period of fifteen months, the police repeatedly came to the residence
Okin shared with her boyfriend but failed to interview or arrest him,
failed to write up domestic violence reports, and at times responded
to her allegations with sarcasm.' As a result, Okin continued to suffer
harm.' Where police response does not protect the victim and the
victim continues to suffer harm, jurisdictions are split as to whether
police officers are accountable for responding inadequately.'
In 2005, 1,181 women were murdered by their significant
others, an average of more than three women murdered per day.'
Additionally, women suffer two million injuries every year at the
hands of their intimate partners.' Since its enactment, the Violence
Against Women Act has served to decrease these figures.'o Today,
the nation's goal remains to decrease these statistics even further."
1. See RAOUL FELDER & BARBARA VICTOR, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: WEAPONS
FOR THE WAR AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 117 (1996).

2. See generally Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges
to the Inadequate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1295, 1297 (1995) (discussing situations in which police responses to domestic violence are

inadequate and may include: "failure to respond to their calls, refusal to arrest batterers, failure to
file reports on domestic disputes, and general harassment of victims of domestic violence").
3. 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009).
4. Id at 419-27.

5. Id
6. Id

7. See infra Parts III.A-B, V.DI-2.
8. FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, THE FACTS ON DOMESTIC DATING
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2009), available at http://endabuse.org/userfiles/file/Children_
andFamilies/DomesticViolence.pdf.
9. See id.
10. Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on September 13, 1994.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended

in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Nat'l Domestic Violence Hotline, Get Educated: Violence
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One of the issues in the battle to decrease domestic violence is
that incidents of domestic violence are severely underreported.12
Current research suggests a correlation between the response of law
enforcement and the reporting of future instances of violence." That
is, when a victim has confidence that the police will respond
appropriately to her complaint, her confidence will lead to more
reports of future violence.14 Conversely, a victim who previously
reported abuse and felt the law enforcement response was
insufficient or endangered her further is less likely to report
subsequent abuse; this failure to report is then likely to lead to an
escalation of violence." Therefore, given the large number of people
adversely affected by domestic violence, law enforcement agencies
must commit time, invest resources, and pay attention to domestic
violence in order to prevent further harm to the victim.16
When police officers respond inadequately to domestic violence
and a victim continues to suffer harm, the victim's best avenue for
redress is to sue the individual police officers for violating the
Against Women Act, http://www.ndvh.org/get-educated/violence-against-women-act-vawa/ (last
visited June 10, 2010) (noting that since VAWA's enactment, states have passed over 660 laws to
combat domestic violence and that more women reported a domestic-violence crime in 1998 (59
percent) than in 1993 (48 percent)); Posting of Tracy Russo to the White House Blog,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/15-Years-Later (Sept. 14, 2009, 17:51 EST).
11. President Barack Obama recognizes the significance of this issue and has committed his
administration to achieving this goal. For example, Lynn Rosenthal, one of the nation's foremost
experts on domestic violence policy, was appointed the White House Advisor on Violence
Against Women. The Associated Press, Lynn Rosenthal Named White House Adviser on Violence
6

Against Women, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/06/2 /
lynn rosenthal namedwhitehou.html. This is a newly created position at the White House,
dedicated specifically to advising the President and Vice President on domestic violence issues.
Id.; Office of the Vice President, Press Release, The White House Press Office, Vice President
Biden Announces Appointment of White House Advisor on Violence Against Women (June 26,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thejpress office/Vice-President-Bidenavailable at
2009),
Announces-Appointment-of-White-House-Advisor-on-Violence-Against-Women/.
12. See Larry Miller, Domestic Violence Hiding in the Open, PHILA. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2009, at

lB. While this is an important concern, this Note is not intended to overshadow the other
essential issues of domestic violence. In fact, progress in the fight against domestic violence will
be limited until there is full awareness by "police, hospitals, social service agencies, shelters,
batterers' intervention programs, offices of lawyers and prosecutors, judges, and [private
individuals]." See FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 1, at 32.

13. ANDREw R. KLEIN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 7

(2009),
14.
15.
16.

availableat http://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffiles 1/nij/225722.pdf.
Id.
Id at 8.
Id at 1.
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victim's substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17
However, part of determining whether police officers can be held
liable for the danger individuals face from third parties depends on
how circuit courts interpret the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services." In
DeShaney, the Court held that the state was not liable for the severe
injuries that a four-year-old boy suffered from his father's abuse
because historically, states have not had a constitutional duty to
protect individuals from violence committed by a third party. 9 The
Court reasoned that the state's failure to remove the child from his
abusive home was an omission, which does not constitute a
substantive due process violation.20 However, the Court indicated in
dictum that a constitutional claim may exist pursuant to § 1983 if a
state actor created or contributed to the danger that an individual
faced from a third party.2 1 After DeShaney, courts examining this
concept have termed it the "state-created danger" doctrine.22
This Note discusses applying the state-created danger doctrine to
hold individual police officers accountable for responding
inadequately to domestic-violence situations. Part II describes the
origin, definition, and current application of the state-created danger
doctrine, the shocks-the-conscience standard, and the qualifiedimmunity defense. Part III critiques the current application of the
state-created danger doctrine in domestic-violence contexts by

17. In order to state a valid claim under § 1983, an injured party must prove: (1) deprivation
of a right secured by the United States Constitution; and (2) deprivation by a party acting under
color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). While this Note argues substantive due process is the
best theory for recovery, victims may sue pursuant to other theories. For example, a victim may
sue for failure to provide equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment or for police
negligence pursuant to state tort claims. See Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police
for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1393, 1393-94 (1990) (discussing that an
equal protection claim "may provide a more promising legal avenue for redress than a due
process claim").
18. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
19. Id. at 193, 196-97.
20. See id.at 199-201.
21. See id ("While the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the victim] faced in
the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more
vulnerable to them.").
22. See Matthew D. Barrett, Note, Failingto Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable
and Consistent "State-Created Danger" Analysis for Establishing Constitutional Violations
Under Section 1983, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 177, 178 (2003).
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examining the Fourth Circuit case Pinder v. Johnson23 and the Third
Circuit case Burella v. City of Philadelphia.4 Part IV proposes that
Congress should enact legislation setting forth a uniform national
standard for determining whether state-created danger exists in a
particular case. This part also explains that the standard should be
based on the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin25 and should not focus
on the distinction between an action and an omission. Most
importantly, the legislation must ensure that courts consider the
unique nature of domestic violence while interpreting the statute.
Part V provides a justification for the proposal. It explains that police
culture regarding domestic violence must change because the police
play a crucial role in protecting victims. The state-created danger
doctrine can be a powerful tool to motivate this change. Further,
domestic violence affects so many people that it requires the national
attention that only a federal law can provide.
Finally, Part VI concludes that enacting federal legislation
modeled after the Second Circuit's approach in Okin would make the
state-created danger doctrine a powerful resource for combating
domestic violence by recognizing the constitutional rights of
domestic-violence victims. By holding police officers accountable
for responding inadequately to domestic-violence calls, federal
legislation would force the officers to handle these situations
properly. In turn, this would send a message to the abusers that their
behavior is unacceptable. But most importantly, federal legislation
will provide victims with the hope of escaping the violence they live
in.
II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW

A. The State-CreatedDangerDoctrine
Generally, the state has no duty to protect individuals from
violence committed by third parties.2 6 However, an exception to this

23. 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995).
24. 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007).
25. 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009).
26. Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 1 (2007)
("[T]he government has no duty to protect people from privately inflicted harms."). For the
purposes of this Note, the term "third party" refers to non-state actors that inflict harm.
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rule is the state-created danger doctrine. 27 The groundwork for the
state-created danger doctrine arose from the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in DeShaney.2 8
Joshua DeShaney was a four-year-old boy who was so severely
beaten by his father that he lapsed into a life-threatening coma. 29 For
two years prior to that incident, the Winnebago County Department
of Social Services had monitored DeShaney and was fully aware of
his father's abuse." Yet despite repeatedly observing suspicious
injuries on DeShaney's body, the agency never removed him from
his father's custody.
Through his guardian ad litem and pursuant to § 1983,
DeShaney sued the Department of Social Services and the social
workers who received the complaints that he was being abused.32
DeShaney claimed that their failure to act deprived him of his liberty
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.33 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin granted summary judgment to defendants, and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether failure by a state or its agents to provide an
individual with adequate protective services ever violates the
individual's due process rights.3 ' The Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit's holding and ruled that the state has an affirmative duty to
protect private citizens from state action, but has no such duty to
protect private citizens from each other's actions.3 ' The Court
reasoned that even though the state may have been aware of the
dangers the boy faced, "it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."3 ' Further,
the Court held that the state only owes a duty to protect when the

27. Id. at 3.

28. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
29. Id. at 193.

30. Id. at 191-92.
31. Id.
32. Id at 193.

33. Id.
34. Id at 193-94.
35. Id. at 194.

36. Id at 200-01.
37. Id at 201.
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state takes an individual into custody, thereby literally depriving the
individual of liberty."
While the Court's decision implied grim consequences for
victims, circuit courts have interpreted it as leaving open the
possibility that if the state itself played a role in creating or
increasing the danger to a child, then the state could be liable for a
substantive due process violation.39 This interpretation laid the
groundwork for the state-created danger doctrine.40 Under this
doctrine, a police officer is liable if he or she creates or substantially
increases the risk of violence that leads to an individual's injuries. 4'
However, because this theory derives from Supreme Court
dictum, there is a lack of guidance from the Court regarding how to
apply it. 42 Thus, even though most circuits acknowledge the statecreated danger doctrine, its scope and limitations are still ill-defined 43
and its application is considerably inconsistent.44
B. The Shocks-the-ConscienceStandard
Proving state-created danger is only the first step in successfully
alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to § 1983. In
addition, a domestic-violence victim has to demonstrate that the
officer's conduct shocked the conscience. 45 This requirement exists
because § 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state actor, such as a
police officer, but does not create substantive rights or define what

38. Id at 198-200 ("The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of
the individual's predicament . .. but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to
act on his own behalf.").
39. See Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-CreatedDanger Doctrine, 13 WM.

& MARY BILL RTs. J. 1165, 1166-67 (2005).
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 3-4.
41. See Oren, supra note 39, at 1168.
42. See Chemerinsky, supranote 26, at 15.
43. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 188 (explaining that while all circuits except for the First
and Fourth recognize the doctrine, they each apply a different test).
44. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the dictum verbatim but uses an ambiguous test. Id. at
188-89. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits each apply tests that poorly
define what dangers or forms of conduct create liability. See id at 190-99. The Third, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits apply more elaborate multi-part tests. See id at 200-04. For an example of the
inconsistencies, see infra Parts III and V.D. 1-2.
45. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-48 & n.8 (1998) (finding that in
order to be liable for a violation of a constitutional right, a state actor's conduct must be "so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience").
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type of conduct creates a cause of action. 46 The requirement also
ensures that a constitutional violation does not occur "whenever
someone cloaked with state authority causes harm" 47 and prevents
the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a "font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered
by the States." 48
As a result, liability thresholds for depriving an individual of
constitutional rights must be stricter than state tort thresholds. 49 The
lowest common denominator for tort liability is negligence, which is
not enough to establish a constitutional violation.so On the other
hand, the highest common denominator of tort liability, intentional
conduct, is most likely enough." For actions that fall between the
two ends of the spectrum, constitutional liability may occur when the
state actor's conduct can be classified as deliberately indifferent.52
What constitutes deliberate indifference or shocks the
conscience, however, is highly dependent on the circumstances of
each case" and differs from court to court.54 Establishing a national
standard for the state-created danger caused by officers responding

46. See 1 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:1 (2009).

47. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
See id at 848-49.
Id.
Id. at 849.

52. Id at 849-50; see also Laura Oren, Some Thoughts on the State-Created Action
Doctrine: DeShaney Is Still Wrong and Castle Rock Is More of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIv.

RTS. L. REV. 47, 54 (2006) ("[M]any courts have demanded a showing of 'deliberate
indifference' that 'shocks the conscience' in order to hold state actors responsible for the crimes
of third parties.").
53. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850 ("Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not
be so patently egregious in another. . . .").
54. See Oren, supra note 52, at 54. In Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801 (8th Cir.

2005), the Eight Circuit reversed a jury verdict that awarded $225,000 each to individual police
officers who were retaliated against when their personal information was disclosed to drug
defendants. Id at 803. The Eighth Circuit held that the City was, at most, only grossly negligent.
Id. at 808. Similarly, in Forresterv. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit held
the Division of Family Services did not act with deliberate indifference where they failed to
remove children from an abusive home despite their receipt of complaints and investigations of
the home. Id at 1050-51, 1058-59. However, in Doe v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit found that it was possible to infer that
an agency acted with deliberate indifference when its failure to remove a child from an abusive
foster home amounted to a pattern of deliberate inattention to its duty to protect children from
abuse. Id at 142-46.
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inadequately to domestic violence would heighten awareness about
the dangers and prevalence of domestic violence. Such awareness
would force police officers, judges, and society as a whole to view
the issues of domestic violence differently. And in light of this new
awareness, conduct that was once considered negligent or grossly
negligent would, hopefully, be considered to shock the conscience.
Nevertheless, victims would still have another hurdle to overcomethe police officers' defense of qualified immunity.
C. The Qualified-Immunity Defense

Where a police officer is accused of violating an individual's
due process rights, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity." This protects officials from liability unless they violate a
law that was clearly established at the time of their conduct."6
According to the Supreme Court, "[q]ualified immunity balances two
important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.""
In any given case, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate
that qualified immunity does not apply." To accomplish this, the
plaintiff must prove that his or her constitutional right has been
violated and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the
conduct in question." The "clearly established" standard means that
the legal principle must be settled with enough specificity that the
officers were put on notice that their conduct was unlawful.60 This
specificity requirement does not depend on a precedent existing in
the same circuit in which the case arose, as long as the law is

55. See generally Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who

Should Pay?, 50 U. PIrr. L. REV. 935 (1989) (discussing the derivation of the modern qualified
immunity defense in § 1983 cases).
56. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (holding that government officials
are generally shielded from liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
57. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
58. See id. at 815-16.
59. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Recently, the Supreme Court held that
the order of this analysis is flexible. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 813.
60. Oren, supranote 39, at 1201.
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supported by a consensus of the circuits.' Furthermore, just because
a case presents novel factual circumstances, the "clearly established"
analysis is not automatically in favor of the officer.6 2 Rather, the
analysis focuses on whether a reasonable person in the officer's
position would have been aware of the law.63
Part of the battle against domestic violence is to make adequate,
and thus appropriate, action by police officers the "clearly
established" law. To this end, different cities across the country have
implemented programs to spread awareness regarding the most
effective way to handle domestic-violence situations.
For example, a county in northern California has organized a
program whereby police officers responding to domestic-violence
calls are accompanied by trained volunteers.' The volunteers are
trained to speak with the victims at the scene and to fill out
temporary restraining orders.65 In Farmington, New Mexico, the
police department has given six officers specialized training to
improve their communication with domestic-violence victims and to
help them develop unique skills for collecting evidence.66 This
training is especially useful when officers respond to situations
where victims refuse to disclose the abuse." Furthermore, the added
knowledge gives officers a safer way to approach each situation."
61. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329-31 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the Fifth Circuit was required to consider "'a consensus of cases of persuasive authority' in
deciding qualified immunity in a state-created danger lawsuit (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617 (1999))).
62. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[O]fficials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.").
63. See Oren, supra note 39, at 1201 n.257 (stating that objective reasonableness is required
for qualified immunity). If officers of reasonable competence could disagree regarding the
legality of the conduct, then the objective test is met and immunity should be recognized. Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Thus, if no officer would conclude that the conduct is
lawful, then there is no immunity. See id. Some courts interpret this to mean that an officer who
violates a clearly established law is immune if he had an objectively reasonable belief that his
conduct was lawful. See Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2007). Other courts
disagree, holding that the objectively reasonable inquiry is always part of the clearly established
inquiry. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
64. Lydia M. Harris, New Effort Targets Domestic Violence, ORLAND PRESS-REG., Feb. 5,

2010.
65. Id.
66. Elizabeth Piazza, FarmingtonPolice Unit Gets Special Training to CombatingDomestic

Violence, THE DAILY TIMES (Maryville, TN), Feb. 7,2010.
67. Id
68. Id

1544

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1533

Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a domestic-violence
awareness program. There, a council committee approved a separate
domestic-violence court because these courts "make a difference in
cutting down on violence and the number of murders" in the cities
that utilize them.69
Despite the above and other programs, women suffer two
million injuries at the hands of their intimate partners every year.o
Implementing a national standard for state-created danger could be
an effective tool for making police officers aware of the danger of
domestic violence by making them accountable for their conduct.
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
The state-created danger doctrine developed from Supreme
Court dictum." Because the dictum provided no guidance on the
doctrine, circuit courts differ in their applications of it.72 For
example, the Fourth Circuit rejects the doctrine completely," while
the First Circuit rejects it "with some hesitation."74 In the remaining
circuits that have acknowledged the state-created danger doctrine,
the result is usually not in the plaintiff's favor."
A. The Fourth Circuit'sApproach
The Fourth Circuit declined to apply the state-created danger
doctrine in a tragic domestic violence case that ended in the death of
three young children." In Pinder v. Johnson, Officer Donald Johnson
responded to a domestic-violence call at Carol Pinder's residence."
Pinder alleged that her former boyfriend, Don Pittman, broke into her
house, pushed her, punched her, and threatened to kill her and her

69. Jon Chrisos, Committee Approves Resolution to Establish Domestic Violence Court,
wAVE 3 NEWS (Louisville), Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.wave3.com/Global/story.asp?S= 1929979.
In Chicago, a similar domestic violence court was recently approved because "'domestic violence
continues to be a serious threat and deserves the added attention."' Barbara Vitello, New Court
Division to Focus on Domestic Violence Issues, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Dec. 10, 2009, at 4.
70. See FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, supra note 8.

71. See Chemerinsky,supra note 26, at 3.
72. See Barrett,supra note 22, at 188.
73. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1178 (4th Cir. 1995).
74. Barrett, supra note 22, at 205-07.
75. See Oren, supra note 39, at 1173-74.
76. Pinder,54 F.3d at 1172, 1178-79.
77. Id. at 1172.
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three children." As a result, Johnson arrested Pittman. 79 Before
Johnson left, Pinder explained to the officer that Pittman had recently
been released from prison after a conviction for attempted arson of
Pinder's residence." Pinder said she was afraid for her family's
safety and asked Johnson whether it was safe for her to return to
work that night." Johnson assured her that Pittman would be locked
up overnight.8 2 Based on this assurance, Pinder returned to work."
Unfortunately, when Johnson brought Pittman for an appearance
before a county commissioner, the commissioner only charged him
with trespass and malicious destruction of property, both
misdemeanor offenses.84 As a result, Pittman was released on his
own recognizance." Immediately after his release, while Pinder was
at work, he made the ten-minute walk from the police station to
Pinder's house and set it on fire.86 Her three children slept inside
while the house burned and all three died of smoke inhalation. 7
Pinder sued Officer Johnson pursuant to § 1983 alleging that he
was liable under the state-created danger doctrine because he
"created or enhanced" the danger she faced by assuring her of her
safety but failing to charge Pittman with a serious offense."
However, the Fourth Circuit ruled that there was no state-created
danger in this case." The court reasoned that a police officer does not
create or enhance the danger an individual faces "every time [that the
officer] does anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party
more likely." 90 The court added that "the most that can be said of
[Johnson] ... is that [he] stood by and did nothing when suspicious

circumstances dictated a more active role for [him]." 9 1
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
(1989)).

Id
Pinder v. Comm'rs of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D. Md. 1993).
Id.
Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
Id. at 1172, 1175.
Id. at 1175.
Id
Id. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203
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B. The Third Circuit'sApproach
In the Third Circuit, it is extremely difficult for domesticviolence victims to prevail in § 1983 proceedings against police
officers. The circuit generally applies a four-part test for analyzing
claims under the state-created danger doctrine.92 However, in a recent
domestic-violence case, the circuit narrowly focused on one of the
elements and concluded that no state-created danger existed.9 3
94
George Burella, a police
In Burella v. City of Philadelphia,
officer, abused his wife, Jill, for many years.95 Jill complained to the
police, George's supervisor, and Internal Affairs." On one occasion,
George assaulted Jill at a bar but left before the police arrived.97
Upon arriving at home, he called Jill and threatened to kill their son
if she did not return home." When she arrived at their house, George
had a gun and threatened to shoot her.99 When the police arrived,
they reported the incident as a domestic disturbance. ' After they
left, George continued to beat Jill until her parents came and
removed her from the home.1 o' George followed them to Jill's
parents' house and when Jill attempted to call the police, he wrestled
the phone away from her.'02
On another occasion, George assaulted Jill while she met with a
friend.' 03 When the officers arrived, they allowed George to leave
with his and Jill's daughter. Then the officers took Jill home, where
George continued to beat her. 04 One week later, an officer served
George with a protection order that prohibited him from threatening
Jill or entering their home, but George immediately violated the
92. Burella v. City of Phila., 501 F.3d 134, 147 n.17 (3d Cir. 2007) (outlining four elements
of a state-created danger claim: (1) the harm caused was foreseeable and direct; (2) the state
action shocks the conscience; (3) plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of defendant's acts; and (4) a
state actor affirmatively created the danger to a citizen).
93. Id. at 146-48.
94. 501 F.3d 134.
95. Id. at 136-38.
96. Id.
97. Id at 137.
98. Id
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id
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order by threatening Jill.o Even though the officer witnessed
George's conduct, he allowed George to enter the house.106 All of
this abuse culminated when George shot Jill in the chest, severely
wounding her, and then shot and killed himself. 107
The Third Circuit ruled that Jill did not have a cognizable due
process claim under § 1983 because she failed to demonstrate
affirmative state action. 1' Instead, the court held that the facts simply
demonstrated an omission-"that the officers failed to act." 109
Because the Third Circuit considered affirmative state action an
element of state-created danger, it found no constitutional
violation.'
IV. PROPOSAL
In cases arising from domestic-violence complaints, federal
courts apply the state-created danger doctrine inconsistently.
Therefore, Congress should enact legislation establishing a standard
for determining whether an individual police officer's conduct
constitutes state-created danger. Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg
provides states with federal grants to combat violent crimes against
women."' The purpose of § 3796gg is to help states "to develop and
strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to
combat violent crimes against women, and to develop and strengthen
victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women." 1 2
To further this purpose, Congress should make the adoption of the
state-created danger law a condition of states receiving grants under

§3796gg.
The most important aspect of the law is that it should reflect the
sensitive and unique nature of domestic violence." 3 To this end, the
law should be modeled after the Second Circuit's analysis in Okin.114
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 146 (reasoning that Jill failed to allege that the "officers affirmatively exercised
their authority in a way that rendered her more vulnerable to her husband's abuse").
109. Id. at 147.
110. Id. at 147-48.
Ill. 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (2006).
112. Id. § 3796gg(a).
113. See infra Part V.A-C.
114. See infra Part V.D.
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Specifically, the law should state that state-created danger exists
when a police officer's affirmative act or omission creates or
enhances the danger to the victim. However, the affirmative act or
omission does not have to be explicit. Instead, an affirmative act by
law enforcement may be implicit, such as when officers' conduct
communicates to an abuser that the officers will not interfere to stop
the private violence.
Additionally, the law should reflect that state-created danger
does not exist when the only action taken by an officer is responding
to a domestic-violence call, with no interaction between the officer
and the victim or the abuser. Furthermore, courts should not apply
the state-created danger doctrine where doing so would place officers
in a predicament that subjects them to liability whether they take
action or fail to do so.
V. JUSTIFICATION
There are several reasons why Congress should enact legislation
setting forth a national standard for applying the state-created danger
doctrine. First, law enforcement's attitude regarding domestic
violence must change on a national level. Second, because domestic
violence tends to escalate,"' there is a need for accurate reporting so
that officers can step in before it is too late; also, current research
indicates that the quality of the police response to a domesticviolence call affects whether victims will report subsequent acts of
violence."' Finally, because domestic violence is a national problem,
it necessitates a federal remedy.
A. Attitude Adjustment

"Prior to the late nineteenth century, laws and cultural practices
in the United States ... support[ed] a man's right to physically abuse
his wife without [police] intervention.""' Violence by husbands
against their wives was a legitimate form of control and therefore

115. See Abby Simons & Maria Elena Baca, Wife's Worst Fears Come True, STAR TRIB. (St.
Paul, Minn.), Oct. 3, 2009, at Al.
116. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
117. See Sarah Lorraine Solon, Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: Criminal
Law Chapter: Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 369, 373 (2009).
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was beyond the scope of the criminal justice system."' By 1920,
while all the states prohibited physical violence by a husband against
his wife, law enforcement still treated domestic violence as a private
matter and maintained a policy of nonintervention."' However, in the
1970s a number of high-profile lawsuits brought national attention to
the damaging effects of the nonintervention policy. 120 Fearing similar
lawsuits, police departments implemented more aggressive policies
concerning domestic violence.'2 1 Additionally, the Minneapolis
Domestic Violence Experiment found a correlation between
increased arrests and decreased recidivism in batterers, which led
many jurisdictions to implement mandatory arrest statutes.122
Nevertheless, stereotypes of women's traditional subordinate
status and of domestic violence itself continue to influence lawenforcement practices. 123 One way to change law-enforcement
culture is to "confront[] officers' own biases and assumptions about
male entitlement that negatively impact the application of the law." 24
Because police officers are a victim's initial hope for immediate
relief from physical abuse-and possibly their last hope for effective
relief from physical abuse-they play a critical role in eradicating
domestic violence. 125 Therefore, when the police fail to respond
118. Kapila Juthani, Note, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse:
Affirmative Duty to Protectvs. Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 51, 54

(2003).
119. See id at 54-55 (stating that the usual police response to domestic violence was either
telling the female that the police could not intervene or asking one party to leave the house);
Solon, supranote 117, at 373.
120. Solon, supra note 117, at 399-400 (discussing cases that involved women suing police
departments for failing to protect them from domestic abuse). The O.J. Simpson trial also had a
large impact on the public perception of domestic violence and spurred legislative evaluation of
some domestic violence laws. Id at 400 n.232.
121. Id. at 400.
122. Id. at 400-02. However, while the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment did find
that arrests reduced violence for some categories of abusers, later studies have shown they
actually increased violence by African-American and unemployed batterers. Id at 400.
123. Dee Aker, The World Is Watching: New Approach To Domestic Abuse Saves Women's

Lives, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1996, at 1 ("[P]olice are actually obstructing public safety by not
dealing with their attitudes about domestic violence."). One study showed that "rules about
reporting and prosecuting would not work without serious adjustment of the attitudes of
police . . . ." Id. at 2.
124. Id. at 1. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Detective Sergeant Anne O'Dell).
125. Gary M. Bishop, Note, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem

of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1357, 1381-82 (1989) ("Police officers are
typically the first source of help for these women, and therefore women depend upon the officers
to render aid.").
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adequately, they must be held accountable for their conduct.
Furthermore, police culture and attitude must be changed on a
national level because domestic violence is a national problem
affecting a tremendous number of people.126
B. Accurate Reporting

When police officers have a more sensitive and understanding
attitude toward domestic violence, their response to victims' calls for
help will improve. In turn, victims will have more trust in the police
and, therefore, will call on them whenever violence erupts.127 This is
extremely significant because one of the biggest problems with
domestic violence is that victims do not report all the instances of
abuse that they suffer.'28
Domestic violence is often described as a cycle.'29 The common
notion that an unhappy victim would simply leave her abuser is a
misconception."30 Victims stay for various reasons, including but not
limited to lacking the financial means to leave,"' fearing retaliation
by the abuser and others,'32 or being ashamed that society will judge
them.'3 3 But when violence is reported, it increases the chances of
breaking the cycle.' 34 Additionally, reporting is important because
domestic violence tends to escalate, and it is crucial for police to
intervene early, before serious injury or even death results.' Finally,
accurate reporting leads to accurate statistics, which allow
governments to address domestic-violence issues as effectively as
possible. 16
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Solon, supra note 117, at 370-72.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
See Miller, supra note 12, at IB.
LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 49-50 (1979).
See FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 1, at 18-20.
Id. at 19.
See Ariel Zwang, Domestic Violence Victims Must Not Be Intimidated, N.Y. DAILY

NEWS, Feb. 28, 2010, http://.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/02/28/2010-0228_domestic
violence victims must not be intimidated.html.
133. See FELDER & VICTOR, supra note 1, at 19.
134. See Tammy Baldwin, Editorial, Help Break Vicious Cycle of Violence, MADISON CAP.

TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at I1A (explaining that VAWA's passage encouraged victims to report
violence and made police and prosecutors aware that violence only stopped with intervention).
135. See Simons & Baca, supra note 115, at Al.
136. See STEPHANIE RIGER ET.AL., EVALUATING SERVICES FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 45 (2002).
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C. FederalRemedy

Because domestic violence is a national problem, there should
be a federal remedy. Without a federal remedy, domestic-violence
cases are confined to overburdened and underfunded state dockets
that are ill-suited for handling them."' Additionally, litigating stateby-state may result in different interpretations of domestic-violence
cases.138 As a result, a battered woman in Maryland may receive
different treatment and remedies than a battered woman a few miles
away in Washington, D.C. 139 "These few miles may mean the
difference between meaningful protection and none at all."' 40
Conversely, a federal cause of action, like the proposed legislation in
Part IV, supra, would recognize that domestic violence is systemic
and institutional, and would allow victims to seek judicial protection
regardless of where they live.14 1 Further, this federal legislation
would provide a federal remedy in an area where the Supreme Court
has recently limited such recourse.142
D. The Model Approach

The above considerations were factored into the Second
Circuit's approach to state-created danger in the recent domesticviolence case, Okin. Thus, the proposed legislation should be
modeled on the approach in that case.
In Okin, Michele Okin stated her boyfriend, Roy Sears, was
physically abusing her.'43 During a fifteen-month period, Okin made
more than sixteen complaints to the police, hoping they would
protect her.'44 Unfortunately, every time that the police responded to
Okin's calls for help, they failed to respond adequately.14 5 They
137. See Solon, supra note 117, at 375 ("[S]tate dockets have tighter schedules and less
funding than federal courts.").
138. Id.
139. Id
140. Id
141. See id

142. Id. at 374-75 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), where the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a portion of a law that provided a federal civil remedy for the victims
of gender-motivated violence, and Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), where "the
Court held that protective orders were not 'property' worthy of due process protections").
143. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2009).
144. Id at 420-26.
145. Id

1552

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1533

never arrested or interviewed Sears about Okin's allegations, and
they only filed a domestic incident report one time.146
The only occasion when a domestic incident report was filed
was when Okin called the police alleging that Sears grabbed her neck
and choked her.147 Okin claimed this incident occurred because Sears
had told her about an earlier conversation he had with the police
chief, in which Sears told him "that he could not 'help it sometimes
when he smacks Michele Okin around[.]"'"4 8 After hearing this, Okin
tried to call the police, but Sears "stopped her by grabbing her
neck." 49 When the police arrived, Okin showed them her neck as
well as bruises on her legs and asked one of the officers, "Can you
please tell Roy to stop beating me. That is all I want."' Instead, the
officers spoke with Sears about football.'"' Furthermore, they were
"'very derogatory' toward [Okin] when she said she wanted to press
charges."' 52 In the end, the officers did not arrest Sears.'
In the ensuing months, Okin continued to seek police assistance
to no avail. On January 1, 2002, she complained that Sears was
beating her. 5 4 A police officer responded to the house, but made no
written report.' On March 8, 2002, Okin complained that Sears
stabbed her foot and assaulted her the previous night at a hotel in
New Windsor."' The responding officer filed a general incident
report stating that Okin was confused and that, as a lawyer, she
should understand the fact that he had no jurisdiction to help her with
the New Windsor matter.' On March 25, 2002, Okin complained
that Sears threatened to kill her but that she was afraid of filing a
complaint against him because it would make the situation worse."'
The responding officer did not know how to "handl[e] a situation in
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 420.
Id
Id. at 430.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
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which a threat victim says that filing a complaint will just make
things worse," and he did not file a domestic incident report.159 On
April 12, 2002, Okin complained that Sears was stalking her."'o The
responding officer checked the area around the house but did not
interview Sears.'"' On May 12, 2002, Okin's neighbor called the
police because Okin and Sears were fighting and the situation was
"threatening-looking." 6 2 The responding officer did not file a
domestic incident report, did not arrest or interview Sears, and did
not interview the neighbor.' On May 19, 2002, Okin called the
police complaining that the previous day Sears came to her house
and threatened to shoot her." The responding officer did not
interview Sears about the threat and filed a general incident report
stating there were neither victims nor suspects.165
Based on these and additional incidents, Okin alleged that the
responding police officers violated her due process rights.'66 Okin
claimed that the officers' conduct "affirmatively increased the danger
she faced" because it was witnessed by Sears.167 The Second Circuit
agreed and held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the police
officers' conduct fell within the state-created danger exception. 168
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit interpreted the
DeShaney decision as articulating that state-created danger exists
when state action in some way creates or increases the danger to the
victim.' 9 Expanding on that, the court reasoned that the state action
can be either explicit or implicit.'70 The court found that police
conduct is explicit when officers directly communicate to private
actors that they have the freedom to harm others without the risk of

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id at 423.
Id.
Id
Id
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id
Id. at 426.
Id
Id at 427-31.

169. See id. at 428.
170. Id. at 428-29.
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law-enforcement intervention."' However, even if the police do not
explicitly approve or encourage private violence, their repeated,
sustained inaction can communicate that they will not interfere in the
violence.'7 2
The record in Okin gives no indication that the officers made
explicit assurances to Sears that he could act with impunity."'
However, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
officers implicitly conveyed to Sears that his violence was
permissible and would not cause him any problems with the
authorities.' 74 For example, when responding to Okin's complaint
that Sears had beaten and tried to choke her, the officers responded
by speaking with Sears about football."' On another occasion, the
chief of police did not arrest Sears when Sears told him "that he
could not 'help it sometimes when he smacks Michele Okin
around[.]""'76 Furthermore, on numerous occasions, the police
responded to Okin's complaints without filing a domestic incident
report, interviewing Sears, or arresting him."
Additionally, the Second Circuit ruled that the officers' conduct
could be viewed as increasing the danger to Okin."' The officers
"expressed camaraderie with Sears and contempt for Okin."' 7 9 For
the entire time that Okin was contacting the police for help, Sears
was aware of the officers' dismissive and indifferent attitude toward
Okin's complaints.'so Therefore, the deterrent capacity of law

171. Id. at 428 (citing Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding state-created danger where police officers told a group of skinheads that "unless they got
completely out of control, the police would neither interfere with their assaults nor arrest them,"
because the police officers were officially sanctioning privately inflicted injury)).
172. Id. at 428-29 (citing Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding statecreated danger where police officers and supervisors went drinking with an off-duty officer and
then allowed him to drive, which resulted in him killing three people. By participating in the
drinking and allowing it to continue, the officers implicitly communicated to the off-duty officer
that he would not be disciplined for the conduct)).
173. Id. at 429.
174. Id. at 429-30.
175. Id. at 430.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 430-31.
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enforcement was nullified and may have caused Sears to continue his
violence against Okin. '
The Second Circuit's approach to state-created danger did not
focus on the affirmative-act-versus-omission distinction that the
Third Circuit focused on in Burrella v. City of Philadelphia.18 2 In
Burella, the court's focus on affirmative state action was surprising
because in an earlier case, Morse v. Merion School District,'83 it
specifically stated that foreseeability was the most important factor
of its test.'84 In reaching that conclusion, the Morse court stated that
the characterization of state action as an "affirmative act" or an
"omission" may be irrelevant.'
Moreover, the Morse court
commented that a state creates an opportunity for harm if "the state
has in some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that was
foreseeable, and not whether the act was ... an affirmative act or an
omission."l86
Additionally, in Burella, the Third Circuit should not have
focused on the affirmative-act-versus-omission characterization
because the line between the two concepts is unclear.' Conventional
wisdom suggests that the Constitution is a charter of negative
liberties, meaning that it is a series of prohibitory constraints on the
government's power rather than a list of rights to have the
government do or provide anything.' But that notion assumes that
the government can only harm through action and does not take into
account that the government can do as much harm by failing to
promulgate rules or by failing to supervise.'8 9 The same concept also
fails to consider that the government has created individual
181. Id.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra Part IIB.
132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 914.
See id.at 915.

186. Id at 914-15.
187. See id. at 914 ("The case law addressing . . . what constitutes an affirmative act for

purposes of liability, is less than clear. Conduct that has been held to be an affirmative act under
one set of facts has not met that standard in a similar setting."); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) (finding no liability where the State
failed to remove a child from his abusive home despite knowing of the abuse, even though the
State acted when it judged the home to be safe and returned the boy to the home).
188. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273-75
(1990).

189. See id at 2284.
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dependency on its services and in some areas has displaced private
alternatives.

9o

Furthermore, in applying the affirmative-act-versus-omission
logic, the Third Circuit erred in deciding that there was no
affirmative action in Burella. Unlike the Okin court, the Burella
court did not recognize that when police fail to question or arrest the
batterer, the victim faces an increased level of danger because the
police validated the batterer's actions.' 9 ' The Okin court held that
police officers "affirmatively act" when they communicate to the
abuser that he can act with impunity, whether they communicate
explicitly or implicitly. 192 In Burella, just like in Okin, the abuser was
never arrested, and the officers allowed him to continue his reign of
terror, even when it occurred in their presence.193 And as a result, Jill
Burella was severely injured.'94
Similarly, in Pinder,the Fourth Circuit failed to treat Pinder's
case as serious domestic violence and instead simply referred to it as
involving "suspicious circumstances."' The court reasoned that a
police officer does not create or enhance the danger an individual
faces "every time [that the officer] does anything that makes injury at
the hands of a third party more likely."' 9 6 However, the court failed
to recognize that for injury from an abusive boyfriend where the
police mishandle a domestic-violence claim is not simply more
likely, but very likely.'97 In recognizing that domestic violence often
turns tragic,'" the Second Circuit attempted to prevent such tragedy
by holding law enforcement accountable for responding to domestic190. See id. at 2321-22 ("[Government] has ... required or encouraged reliance on its own
regulatory structure in numerous areas, including licensing of professionals, inspection of
buildings, food and drugs, and supervision of child welfare. .. [I]t has stripped citizens of selfhelp remedies in numerous areas." (footnote omitted)).
191. See Browne, supra note 2, at 1309.
192. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 429-31 (2d Cir. 2009).
193. Burella v. City of Phila., 501 F.3d 134, 136-39 (3d Cir. 2007).
194. Id at 138.
195. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989)).
196. Id.
197. See Ian Urbina, Philadelphia to Handle Abuse Calls Differently, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30,
2009, at A13 (calculating that of the 35 domestic homicides recorded in Philadelphia in 2009, 21
of those killed accounted for a total of 178 prior calls to the police).
198. In 2005, 1,181 women were murdered by their significant others. FAMILY VIOLENCE
PREVENTION FUND, supra note 8.
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violence situations in ways that blatantly ignore the deadly threat
facing victims.199 Thus, the Okin decision should be the model for
national legislation. The following two examples illustrate support
for this approach as well as how its scope should be limited.
1. Ninth Circuit Support for the Model Approach
The Ninth Circuit recognizes the importance of the state-created
danger doctrine, and its analysis in a recent case demonstrates that its
approach is similar to that of the Second Circuit. In Kennedy v.
Ridgefield,20 0 a woman complained to the police that a violent
teenage neighbor molested her nine-year-old daughter.2 0' The woman
requested that the police contact her before they contact the neighbor
because she was afraid of what he might do.202 Nevertheless, a police
officer notified the neighbor and his mother first, and then fifteen
minutes later told the woman that he had spoken with the
neighbors.2 03 The officer told the woman not to worry because there
would be extra police cars patrolling the area that night.204 Relying
on the officer's comments, the woman and her husband decided to
stay home and leave early the next morning.205 Unfortunately, that
night the neighbor broke into the couple's house and shot the couple
while they slept, injuring the woman and killing her husband.206
The Ninth Circuit found the police officer liable because he
"affirmatively created an actual, particularized danger [the victim]
would not otherwise have faced."207 Furthermore, by telling the
woman there would be extra police patrol that night, the officer
misrepresented the danger the woman and her husband faced and
thus aggravated the dangerous situation he had created.20 8
The Ninth Circuit's application of the state-created danger
doctrine rested on state actors engaging in affirmative acts that

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 434 (2d Cir. 2009).
439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id at 1057.
See id. at 1058.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 1063.
Id
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created or increased the danger to the victim.20 9 The court's
interpretation of "affirmative" was similar to the Second Circuit's
analysis in Okin. In Kennedy, the court found that the police officer
acted affirmatively when he notified the violent teenage neighbor
and his mother of the molestation allegations before notifying the
woman and consequently provided the violent teenage neighbor with
the opportunity to shoot the woman and her husband before they
could take protective measures.2 01 Similarly, in Okin, the court found
the police officers acted affirmatively when they failed to interview
or arrest Sears even though they knew he had abused Okin, and
thereby enabled Sears to continue his abuse.2 11 Thus, if the Ninth
Circuit is presented with a domestic-violence case alleging
inappropriate conduct by police officers, its application of the statecreated danger doctrine would likely be similar to the Second
Circuit's approach in Okin.
2. Limitation on the Model Approach
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to help and protect
victims of domestic violence, not to make it easier to sue police
officers. A domestic-violence case from the Sixth Circuit
demonstrates a good balance between these two important concerns.
Deborah Kirk, the victim in May v. Franklin County
Commissioners,2 12 called 911 three times during a fight with her
boyfriend Marvin Moss. 2 13 During the first conversation, Kirk told an
officer that there was a domestic problem but that it was under
control. 214 A second conversation between Kirk and the dispatcher
several minutes later made it clear to the dispatcher that Kirk was
being assaulted and that Moss was threatening to harm her further.2 15
As a result, a police car was dispatched to Kirk's apartment to
investigate a possible domestic disturbance. 2 6 After receiving a third
call from Kirk, the dispatcher escalated the call to a "good domestic"
209. See Oren, supra note 52, at 49-50.
210. See Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063.

211. See Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 429-30 (2d Cir.
2009).
212. 437 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2006).
213. Id. at 581.

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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disturbance.2 17 When the officer arrived at the apartment and
knocked on the door, no one answered. 2 18 Not seeing or hearing any
sign of a struggle, the officer cleared the call with the call center and
left.219 The next day, Kirk's body was discovered in the apartment.220
She had died of blunt trauma to the neck.221
The Sixth Circuit held that there was no state-created danger
because dispatching an officer to Kirk's apartment was not an
affirmative act by a state actor.222 First, the officer did not create the
risk by arriving at Kirk's apartment because Kirk and Moss were
fighting before the officer arrived. 2 23 Furthermore, there was no proof
that the officer's knock on the door increased the risk to Kirk.224 The
court claimed that recognizing an affirmative act here would place
police officers in a "Catch-22" where they face liability whether they
take action to help or they fail to do So.225
The May court did not recognize state-created danger in this
domestic-violence situation because the facts are distinguishable
from the facts in Okin. Unlike Kirk, Okin complained to the police
over fifteen times in a fifteen-month period. 226 The police repeatedly
interacted with Okin and were fully aware of the dangers and risks
she faced from Sears. 227 Furthermore, Sears was aware of the
officers' disregard of Okin's complaints, which may have increased
his violence if he believed the police would not interfere.228 In May,
there was no reason to conclude that Moss believed the police would
not interfere if he continued to abuse Kirk.
Therefore, if a situation similar to the situation faced by the
plaintiff in Okin were to present itself in the Sixth Circuit, or any
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id at 582.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id. at 584-86.
Id. at 584.

224. Id. at 584-85. However, the plaintiffs expert testified that the police arrival, lack of
intervention, and withdrawal may have encouraged Moss to continue his violence without fear of
any consequences from the police. Id.
225. Id. at 585-86 (stating that the call center would "face legal and moral objections" if it
failed to dispatch an officer to Kirk's apartment after her calls).
226. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 420-26 (2d Cir. 2009).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 430-31.
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other circuit, and a federal standard like the one proposed in Part IV
were available to the reviewing court, that court could appropriately
and quickly decide the matter as the Second Circuit did in Okin. In
fact, the May decision is not a "loss" for state-created danger cases in
the domestic-violence context because it demonstrates that the goal
is not to flood courts with suits against police officers, but to ensure
that the police act to protect victims of abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
A national standard setting forth guidelines for state-created
danger analysis in domestic-violence situations would greatly aid the
fight against domestic violence. Police officers receive battered
victims' initial call for immediate relief from abuse, and their
response affects whether victims will continue to seek police
assistance if the violence continues. Therefore, they must be held
accountable for responding inadequately to victims' calls for help.
Currently, the state-created danger doctrine is applied inconsistently
by the circuit courts, but the Second Circuit's approach in the Okin
case has been the most effective way to help domestic-violence
victims. The court did not focus on an action-versus-inaction
classification. Instead, it concluded that police action can be implicit,
such as when an officer's conduct communicates to an abuser that
the police will not interfere.229 Therefore, the federal law should be
enacted to reflect the Second Circuit's approach in the Okin case.
Additionally, the law would not give domestic-violence victims carte
blanche to sue police officers and should not be applied in situations
where officers face liability regardless of whether they take action.
Until Congress enacts such legislation and unifies the circuits, courts
that are faced with cases in which police officers responded
inadequately to domestic-violence situations should follow the
Second Circuit's approach in Okin.

229. Id. at 429-31.

